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Abstract—This paper investigates the dependence of existing
state-of-the-art person re-identification models on the presence
and visibility of human faces. We apply a face detection and
blurring algorithm to create anonymized versions of several
popular person re-identification datasets including Market1501,
DukeMTMC-reID, CUHK03, Viper, and Airport. Using a cross-
section of existing state-of-the-art models that range in accuracy
and computational efficiency, we evaluate the effect of this
anonymization on re-identification performance using standard
metrics. Perhaps surprisingly, the effect on mAP is very small,
and accuracy is recovered by simply training on the anonymized
versions of the data rather than the original data. These findings
are consistent across multiple models and datasets. These results
indicate that datasets can be safely anonymized by blurring faces
without significantly impacting the performance of person re-
identification systems, and may allow for the release of new richer
re-identification datasets where previously there were privacy or
data protection concerns.
Index Terms—Person re-identification, Face recognition,
Anonymization
I. INTRODUCTION
The task of person re-identification (re-ID) is to retrieve
images of a specified individual in a large non-overlapping
multi-camera database, also called gallery, given a query person
of interest. It is an important component in intelligent video
surveillance systems, which can be used to improve public
safety with the increasing number of surveillance cameras in
University campuses, theme parks, streets, train stations, and
airports [1]. In addition, tracking with person re-ID can provide
useful information for improving city planning e.g. for retail
space management. Current advances in re-ID can be attributed
to deep learning and the availability of large public image-
and video-based re-ID datasets. Deep learning, in particular,
has significantly improved the accuracy of re-ID systems, but
several recent studies suggest that the number and scale of
available datasets is insufficient [2], [3].
The release of new person re-identification datasets can
raise legitimate privacy concerns. As an example, 97% of the
people surveyed by Harvard Business Review [5] expressed
concern that businesses and the government might use their
data inappropriately. Privacy is one of the most important
political and social concepts in our society and it is vital to
keep sensitive data out of the wrong hands where it may be
used for personal stalking, harassment, identity theft, blackmail,
and mass surveillance [6], [7]. In relation to the data misuse,
article 5(1)(b) of European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) states: “Personal data shall be collected for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a
manner that is incompatible with those purposes.”
Sensitive data and its use is protected under law. One way
to comply with the strict data privacy regulations such as the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the GDPR is data
anonymization. Effective anonymization can allow data to be
released to benefit society without compromising the identities
of the individuals that appear in the data. Data protection laws
such as GDPR do not apply to personal data that have been
anonymized [6], [8]. This fact assures that data breaches with
associated fines can be avoided and that data can be used,
shared, and sold.
The main biometric personal identifier in images and videos
is the human face. Therefore, in the context of person re-ID,
the anonymization process of a dataset could involve de-
identification of individual faces. De-identification is common
in medical imaging [9] and relates to the removal of identifying
information from images prior to sharing of data. Such
information could, for example, potentially be used to derive
a person’s identity. There are several studies on image or
video-based face de-identification [10]–[19]. While person re-
ID itself is a well-developed field and significant progress has
been achieved with modern deep learning-based methods [1],
[20], [21], privacy-preserving face de-identification has received
comparatively little attention [11].
Two years on from the creation of European GDPR, the
issue of data privacy contributes even more to the quest for a
detailed investigation into the impact of anonymization on the
performance of modern person re-ID algorithms. It is important
to understand to which extent the performance of person re-ID
algorithms is diminished by anonymization.
This research investigates for the first time the impact
of anonymization on the accuracy of person re-ID systems.
We benchmark the performance of various state-of-the-art
person re-ID models on five public datasets: Market1501 [22],
DukeMTMC-reID [23], CUHK03 [24], VIPeR [25] and
Airport [26], and quantify the performance penalty of the
face anonymization procedure. Our results show that face
anonymization in benchmark image-based datasets has only
a marginal effect on model performance. This finding could
be important in the decision to release new anonymized re-ID
datasets without breaching privacy regulations or hindering
technology advancement.
Fig. 1. Examples of original (first row) and our anonymized (second row) images from the Market1501 re-ID dataset. For face de-identification, we apply the
TinyFaces [4] face detector first and then blur the detected region with a large kernel Gaussian to remove all privacy-sensitive information.
II. RELATED WORK
Face anonymization. Face anonymization or de-
identification aims at removing privacy-sensitive information
from detected faces. Existing approaches to face de-
identification can be categorized into naı̈ve, the k-same
family of algorithms, and the methods based on Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs).
Naı̈ve methods apply image processing techniques such
as pixelation (image/face subsampling), black-out or blurring
(smoothing the image or the detected face with e.g. a Gaussian
filter with large kernel). There are concerns being raised that
these methods fail in removing privacy-sensitive information in
some cases and no formal privacy guarantees can be made [11],
[14], [18], [19]. Gross et al. [19] e.g. show that blurring and
pixelation can successfully outsmart human recognition. But
these methods, according to the authors, lack a privacy model
and are susceptible to relatively simple attacks. An example
of a naı̈ve method (blur) is shown in Figure 1. We provide
a discussion on the blurring technique and its resistance to
deblurring and other attacks at the end of this paper.
The k-anonymity algorithm of Sweeney [13] lays the theore-
tical foundation for the category of k-same de-identification
of face images. Newton et al. [14] are the first to develop the
privacy-enabling k-same algorithm that preserves many facial
details and at the same time guarantees that face recognition
software cannot recognize de-identified faces. The algorithm
computes similarity between faces based on a distance metric.
Further, it creates new faces by averaging image components,
which may be the eigenvectors or the original image pixels.
Gross et al. [12] design a re-coding system that separates out
identity and non-identity related components based on semi-
supervised learning of multi-factor models.
With the advent of GANs [32] it is possible to generate
images that often resemble the real data distribution. Hukkelas
et al. [11] show that GANs are an efficient tool to remove all
privacy-sensitive information without destroying the original
image quality. Other recent works on GAN-based methods [16],
[17] consider the related task of person obfuscation. Sun
et al. [16] propose a GAN-based method to complete head
regions based on the context and their obfuscation method is
designed to work against any human or machine recognizer. The
method in [17] uses a combination of a parametric face model
reconstruction and GAN-based image synthesis. This method
provides control over facial parameters for manipulation of
identity and enables photo-realistic image synthesis. The recent
architecture of Gafni et al. [15] is based on an adversarial
autoencoder and a trained face classifier. The key objective is
to decorrelate the identity and to fix the expression, pose, and
illumination components. This method for face de-identification
allows automatic video modification at high frame rates.
To our best knowledge, there have not been any prior studies
on face anonymization in the context of person re-ID.
Image-based person re-ID. Approaches to person re-
identification can be categorized into traditional and deep
learning-based methods. Traditional methods aim to design
hand-crafted features and learn an effective distance metric.
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs), recurrent neural net-
works (RNNs), and GANs form the basis for deep learning-
based person re-ID. Wu et al. [20] highlight the fact that almost
all methods for person re-identification in three top conferences
(CVPR, ICCV, ECCV) in recent years are based on deep
learning. The most recent survey by Ye at al. [1] provides
comprehensive analysis of existing deep learning methods
by analyzing their advantages and drawbacks. Here, we only
review the recent contributions in deep learning-based re-ID
technology that are used in this paper. Table I summarizes the
performance of these approaches on two common benchmark
datasets such as Market1501 and DukeMTMC-reID.
We start with the bag of tricks model (BoT) [27] which
leverages a number of effective training “tricks” in person
TABLE I
REPORTED PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED STATE-OF-THE-ART PERSON RE-ID MODELS.
Models Venue Market1501 DukeMTMC-reID
mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1
BoT [27] CVPRW 2019 94.2 95.4 89.1 90.3
PCB [28] ECCV 2018 81.6 93.8 69.2 83.3
MLFN [29] CVPR 2018 74.3 90.0 62.8 81.0
HACNN [30] CVPR 2018 75.7 91.2 63.8 80.5
Resnet50Mid [31] arXiv 2017 75.6 89.9 63.9 80.4
re-ID. The model architecture can remain unchanged as most
tricks can be added to the standard baseline. These training
tricks include:
• a warmup learning rate;
• random erasing augmentation (REA) as initially proposed
by Zhong et al. [33];
• label smoothing (LS) [34], a method used to prevent
overfitting;
• changing the last stride (last spatial down-sampling
operation in the backbone network) from 2 to 1 results
to provide higher spatial feature resolution;
• addition of a batch normalization (BN) layer between
feature extraction and fully connected classifier layers;
and,
• use of the center loss [35].
Luo et al. [27] use these tricks to surpass human-level perfor-
mance using only global features without the part constraints
in the BoT model and report 95.4% rank-1 accuracy and 94.2%
mAP on Market1501 (see Table I).
Sun et al. [28] address the problem of learning discriminative
part-informed features for person retrieval with the development
of their PCB model. This model produces a convolutional
descriptor consisting of several part-level features. Instead of
partitioning the input image, the PCB partitions the 3D tensor
T of activations into p pieces of column vectors g. PCB is
essentially a classification network with small modifications
on the backbone network.
Yu et al. [31] (Resnet50Mid model) leverage mid-level fea-
tures from the earlier layers of a residual deep neural network.
The authors claim that learning discriminative view-invariant
features from multiple semantic levels is very important in deep
learning-based person re-ID. Color and texture are low-level
semantic concepts. High-level semantic concepts can be shape
and gender, for example. The Resnet50Mid model combines
the mid-layer feature maps with the final-layer feature map.
The idea of using multiple semantic levels is also followed
by Chang et al. in [29]. The MLFN model (Multi Level
Factorization Net) developed can learn identity-discriminative
and view-invariant visual factors at multiple semantic levels.
The MLFN architecture is tailored to identify discriminative
latent factors in input images. Different levels of the network
generate latent attributes of different semantic levels.
The harmonious attention convolutional neural network
(HACNN) [30] is a lightweight architecture developed by
using a combination of a novel attention mechanism and
feature representation. This network can learn hard region-level
together with soft pixel-level attention inside person bounding
boxes. The correlated complementary information between
attention selection and feature discrimination is maximized by
using re-ID feature representations.
Despite their merits, the above person re-identification
models match people only at a single scale. To alleviate this
problem, Qian et al. [37] propose a novel multi-scale deep
learning model (MuDeep). Multi-scale learning is adopted
by the MuDeep model to learn discriminative features at
different spatial scales and locations. Unlike all above models,
the authors of MuDeep do not evaluate on Market1501 and
DukeMTMC-reID datasets.
There are many more state-of-the-art person re-ID models
which are covered in some recent reviews [1], [20].
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Face detection
Face detection in person re-ID datasets must deal with
significant challenges associated with large variances in poses
of the face, non-uniform illumination and most of all small face
sizes in low resolution images. Based on this observation, we
decide to use a PyTorch implementation [38] of the TinyFaces
detector [4]. The tiny face detector can work with very small
faces and reduces error by a factor of two compared with
prior methods on the WIDER FACE dataset. However, even
TinyFaces is not 100% accurate. As an example, consider the
Airport dataset. The query set of the Airport dataset contains
1003 images and the number of missed detections amounts
to around 100 images. Inspection of 500 of the 2420 gallery
images shows the detector misses approx. 40 faces, indicating
approximately 90% recall in this dataset.
The CUHK03 dataset contains 28k images. Visual inspection
of the first 1000 reveals that the detector misses less than 20
faces. Assuming the first 1000 images represent an unbiased
sample, then we have approx. 98% recall. Using the same
methodology we find that face detection has approx. 90%
recall on Market1501 and DukeMTMC-reID datasets.
The VIPeR dataset is immensely challenging due to small
data size and low image resolution [37]. The dataset consists
of two folders cam a and cam b and the training, query, and
gallery splits are defined in the supplied JSON file. TinyFaces
does not detect many faces in the VIPeR dataset with the default
TABLE II
STATISTICS OF THE IMAGE-BASED PERSON RE-ID DATASETS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTAL PART OF THIS PAPER.
Dataset Released in Cameras Identities Training images Gallery images Query images
Market1501 [22] 2015 6 1,501 12,936 19,732 3,368
DukeMTMC-reID [23] 2017 8 1,404 16,522 17,661 2,228
CUHK03 (detected) [24] 2014 6 1,360 7,365 1,400 5,332
Airport [26], [36] 2018 6 770 3,493 2,420 1,003
VIPeR [25] 2008 2 632 316 316 316
probability threshold (only 5.7% of images in cam a have a
face detected with a threshold of 0.65). This is likely due to the
low resolution of the images and the fact that many images have
side-profile faces or no face (back of the head). Lowering the
threshold to 0.05, TinyFaces detects faces in 41.77% of images
in cam a and 8.23% on cam b (cam b contains many more
images with side and back profiles). Since false positives do not
pose a problem, in cases with no detections we add a default
detection with bounding box x0, y0, x1, y1 = (15, 4, 35, 23).
This default detection is selected based on the average detected
face location in cam a, adding 4 pixels to the width of the
box to account for the larger variance in the x-direction.
B. Face anonymization
Face de-identification in each dataset is performed by
blurring. We use a pre-trained state-of-the-art TinyFaces model
to detect faces and locate a bounding box for each face. A
crop of the bounding box is then extracted and blurred using a
Gaussian blur filter with radius equal to 1/8 the width of the
size of the bounding box. This method is chosen to ensure that
the filter radius scales with the size of the bounding box and
ensure that a stronger blur is applied to higher resolution face
patches. Experimentally 1/8 is verified to effectively remove
all identifying face features. Figure 1 illustrates the results of
this procedure.
C. Datasets
We evaluate the effect of anonymization on five popular per-
son re-identification datasets: Market1501 [22], DukeMTMC-
reID [23], CUHK03 [24], VIPeR [25], and Airport [36]. Table II
summarizes statistics for these datasets.
Market1501 contains 32,668 images of 1,501 pedestrians,
each of which is recorded by at most six cameras placed in front
of a campus supermarket. There are 3.6 images on average at
each viewpoint for each person. Background clutter and the
misalignment problem are some of the re-ID challenges due
to all dataset images being cropped using a deformable part
model (DPM) detector.
DukeMTMC-reID is a relatively new, manually annotated,
calibrated, multi-camera data set recorded outdoors on the Duke
University campus. It was captured by eight non-overlapping
camera views. It contains 1,404 identities captured in more
than two cameras along with 408 identities (distractors) in only
one camera, 16,522 training images, 17,661 gallery images,
and 2,228 queries.
CUHK03 consists of 13,164 images of 1,360 pedestrians
recorded by six cameras. Each identity is captured from two
disjoint camera views. There are an average of 4.8 images in
each view. DPM-detected and hand-labeled bounding boxes are
both provided. Misalignment, occlusions, and missing body-
parts are common re-ID challenges in this dataset as it is close
to a realistic setting.
VIPeR, despite being one of the earlier released dataset,
is considered one of the most challenging. It consists of 632
pedestrian image pairs taken from arbitrary viewpoints under
varying illumination conditions. This dataset contains two
cameras, each of which captures one image per person. It
also provides the viewpoint angle of each image. Each image
is resized to 128× 48 pixels.
Airport was captured from six cameras of an indoor
surveillance network in a mid-sized airport in Cleveland,
USA [26], [36]. Each camera has 768×432 pixels and captures
video at 30 frames per second. 12-hour long videos from 8
AM to 8 PM were collected and each video was randomly
spit into 40 five minute long clips. This dataset captures time-
varying crowd dynamics and thus differs from the other datasets
in the temporal aspect. It is useful to evaluate the temporal
performance of the re-ID algorithms. There are 9,651 identities,




We use the Pytorch-based Torchreid library developed by
Zhou and Xiang [39] for the PCB, MLFN, Resnet50Mid,
HACNN, and MuDeep models. We implement the BoT model
according to [40].
Training. We train the PCB, MLFN, Resnet50Mid, HACNN,
and MuDeep models for 100 epochs using the cross entropy
loss. Horizontal random flip and random 2D translation
augmentation methods are used during training where the image
size is first increased to (1+ 18 ) with the probability of p = 0.5
and then the random crop is performed. The number of parts
in the PCB model is set to six. Adam is used as the optimizer
with default hyperparameters of β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999.
The initial learning rate is set to 0.003 and the learning rate
decay is γ = 0.1. The batch size is 32 by default.
We train the BoT model for 120 epochs using both cross
entropy loss and a triplet loss. We use a Resnet50 with pre-
trained on ImageNet as the backbone network. Adam is used
to optimize the model. The warmup learning rate strategy for
the BoT model is as follows: first, the learning rate linearly
increases from 3.5× 10−5 to 3.5× 10−4 in the first 10 epochs.
Then, the learning rate is decayed to 3.5×10−5 and 3.5×10−6
at 40th epoch and 70th epoch respectively. The learning rate
lr(t) at epoch t is computed as:
lr(t) =

3.5× 10−5 × t10 if t ≤ 10
3.5× 10−4 if 10 < t ≤ 40
3.5× 10−5 if 40 < t ≤ 70
3.5× 10−6 if 70 < t ≤ 120
The hyperparameters for the random erasing augmentation
(REA) [33] are set to p = 0.5; 0.02 < Se < 0.4; r1 = 0.3;
r2 = 3.33. In addition to REA, the BoT model also applies
random horizontal flips with probability of p = 0.5. The label
smoothing parameter ε is set to be 0.1, and batch size to 64.
Testing. The BoT model was tested with cosine distance
using the features after batch normalization (BN) and k-
reciprocal re-ranking [41]. The batch size is set to 128. We
report the Rank1 accuracy and mean Average Precision (mAP)
as standard performance evaluation metrics.
B. Impact of anonymization on performance
Comparisons between six state-of-the-art models (PCB,
MLFN, HACNN, Resnet50Mid, MuDeep, and BoT) on Market-
1501, DukeMTMC-reID, VIPeR, Airport and CUHK03 datasets
are shown in Tables III-VII. We report results for three cases
where we (i) train and test on the original dataset; (ii) train on
the original and evaluate on the anonymized dataset; and (iii)
train and test on the anonymized dataset.
We observe that the performance results follow the same
pattern for each dataset. The performance is marginally dimin-
ished when we train on the original and evaluate all models
on the anonymized versions of all datasets. The accuracy is,
however, recovered by training on the anonymized versions of
all datasets.
Overall, the difference in performance figures is very small
for all datasets. We conduct a paired sample t-test to analyze
the performance before and after the anonymization, and to test
if the anonymization had a statistically significant effect on the
performance. The average mAP across all models and datasets
before anonymization is 58.07 and 56.68 after anonymization
(-1.39), and 57.44 after retraining on the anonymized data
(-0.63). Anonymization and retraining does have a statistically
significant effect on mAP (one-sided paired t-test, p < 0.01) but
the effect size is small (0.63). Similar conclusions are found for
rank-1 accuracy: average rank-1 accuracy before anonymization
is 66.69, after is 65.45 (-1.24), and after retraining is 66.25
(-0.44). Again, the difference in mean is significant (p < 0.05),
but very small (less than half a percentage point).
C. Effect of different face anonymization techniques
This section investigates how different types of face de-
identification techniques impact re-ID performance. We focus
on the state-of-the-art BoT model and the Market1501 dataset.
Fig. 2. Example of different face anonymization techniques on a 64× 128
sample image from the image-based Market1501 dataset. Top row: original
face image, blackout on the face detected with the TinyFaces detector, blank;
Bottom row: pixelated, inpainted, blurred with a large-kernel Gaussian.
We consider five anonymization techniques: blur, blank, zero,
inpaint, and pixelate. Blur uses a Gaussian filter with a radius
equal to 1/8 of the width of the face crop; zero replaces the
detected face pixels with zero; blank replaces detected pixels
with the average pixel value; inpaint uses Poisson-based image
inpainting; and pixelate resizes detected region to (n, n) with
n = 6 and then upsamples to the original face crop size using
nearest neighbor interpolation. Figure 2 shows an example of
the above techniques on a sample from the Market1501 dataset.
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table VIII.
We observe that most methods provide comparable results,
with blur and pixelate being slightly superior. The results are
somewhat better when trained and tested on the anonymized
versions of the Market1501 dataset. Zeroing the faces (replacing
all face pixels with zero) is only 0.25% on average below blur.
Therefore, the complete zeroing of the face can be used instead
of blurring in cases when extra security is needed.
V. DISCUSSION
Resistance to deblurring and other attacks. Existing SoA
for deblurring faces (e.g. [42]–[44]) are focused on either
removing a type of structured face blurring that occurs due to
motion (e.g. [42], [44]) or relatively minor blurring that can
occur due to camera defocus and similar effects (e.g. [43]).
The structure present in motion blur offers the opportunity to
achieve very good results in removing this type of distortion,
but these techniques do not work on strong (large kernel,
high variance) Gaussian blurs, which simply remove all high-
frequency components in the Fourier spectrum. Techniques
such as [43] also cannot recover faces that have been blurred
using strong Gaussian blurs, since the information about the
detail in the face is effectively completely removed.
Image super resolution techniques (e.g. [45]) are effective
for generating realistic high-resolution content from low-
resolution imagery. These techniques, however, effectively only
hallucinate a plausible realistic high-resolution version of the
low-resolution contents, and therefore cannot be used to reveal
the true anonymized face.
Gross et al. [18] argue that pixelation and blurring are
insufficient to hide identity, and that more sophisticated
TABLE III
MARKET1501 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.
Trained and tested on Trained on original, Trained and tested on
original tested on anonymized anonymized
Models mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1
PCB 72.8 87.8 71.7 87.4 72.9 88.2
MLFN 71.4 87.4 70.9 86.9 71.3 87.5
HACNN 67.4 85.5 66.5 85.7 66.6 85.2
Resnet50Mid 72.9 88.1 71.5 87.5 72.7 87.9
MuDeep 44.9 70.4 43.7 70.0 44.8 69.6
BoT 94.1 95.5 93.7 95.0 94.0 95.2
TABLE IV
DUKEMTMC-REID PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.
Trained and tested on Trained on original, Trained and tested on
original tested on anonymized anonymized
Models mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1
PCB 66.3 80.3 64.4 79.3 65.4 80.2
MLFN 60.4 78.1 57.9 76.8 59.7 77.2
HACNN 57.4 74.0 55.5 72.2 56.7 73.1
Resnet50Mid 62.9 80.1 60.1 78.7 61.8 80.8
MuDeep 36.0 56.6 34.4 54.4 34.8 54.7
BoT 88.8 90.4 87.8 89.7 88.6 90.3
TABLE V
VIPER PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.
Trained and tested on Trained on original, Trained and tested on
original tested on anonymized anonymized
Models mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1
PCB 55.3 43.0 54.6 42.7 55.5 41.1
MLFN 37.4 23.7 34.0 21.8 37.1 25.0
HACNN 25.4 14.9 25.1 14.9 25.6 15.8
Resnet50Mid 40.9 29.1 37.9 25.3 39.5 28.5
MuDeep 23.1 13.9 23.2 13.9 21.6 12.3
BoT 35.9 23.4 33.0 20.3 33.8 22.5
techniques are needed. They show that images that are pixelated
and blurred can still be matched/classified correctly against a
dataset of similarly distorted images. However, the dataset used
is relatively small and simple (275 subjects), and the matching
techniques are outdated (PCA based), which indicates that the
subjects were being matched based on relatively coarse-grained
characteristics (e.g. hair color or similar surrounds). The paper
also indicates that very strong blurring (as we have done)
strongly damages recognition ability.
Note that Google uses similar image blurring technology
in their Google Street View system to blur faces and license
plates and that this technology has been deployed since 2009
without any major incidents in terms of deblurring the images.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we empirically observed that the effect of
blurring faces on the person re-identification performance
is surprisingly small. We also find that the relative per-
formance of different state-of-the-art methods is preserved
after anonymization, meaning that new approaches can be
safely compared using anonymized data. Going forward, we
believe this provides important guidance for future person re-
identification research with anonymized datasets. One possible
line of future work will be to investigate privacy-preserving face
de-identification methods such as those from the GAN-based
family of algorithms.
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TABLE VI
AIRPORT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.
Trained and tested on Trained on original, Trained and tested on
original tested on anonymized anonymized
Models mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1
PCB 60.2 58.1 59.9 57.8 59.9 58.5
MLFN 63.6 61.3 63.0 61.3 62.4 60.9
HACNN 37.1 32.5 35.8 31.2 37.5 33.7
Resnet50Mid 61.6 58.5 60.6 58.0 61.1 59.2
MuDeep 21.9 20.6 20.5 18.7 19.8 16.8
BoT 62.3 60.3 56.4 51.7 61.1 59.2
TABLE VII
CUHK03 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.
Trained and tested on Trained on original, Trained and tested on
original tested on anonymized anonymized
Models mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1
PCB 50.4 52.9 47.5 49.5 50.4 51.1
MLFN 51.8 53.4 48.6 50.7 51.7 53.6
HACNN 32.6 30.7 31.7 30.4 32.9 32.4
Resnet50Mid 52.6 54.2 49.7 53.1 51.1 52.9
MuDeep 22.5 23.4 21.2 22.4 22.2 23.3
BoT 58.4 61.1 67.9 64.2 56.8 59.3
TABLE VIII
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE BOT MODEL ON MARKET 1501 DATASET UNDER DIFFERENT FACE ANONYMIZATION TECHNIQUES.
Trained on original, tested on anonymized Trained and tested on anonymized
Face anon. tech. mAP Rank1 mAP Rank1
Blur 93.7 95.0 94.0 95.2
Zero 93.4 94.6 93.8 94.5
Blank 93.7 95.0 93.8 95.7
Pixelate 94.0 95.3 94.0 95.4
Inpaint 93.6 95.0 93.6 95.0
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